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Abstract
We efﬁciently combine unpredictability and veriﬁability by
extending the Goldreich–Goldwasser–Micali construction
of pseudorandom functions
f
s from a secret seed
s, so that
knowledge of
s not only enables one to evaluate
f
s at any
point
x, but also to provide an
N
P-proof that the value
f
s
 
x
  is indeed correct without compromising the unpre-
dictabilityof
f
s at any otherpoint for which no such a proof
was provided.
1 Introduction
PSEUDORANDOM ORACLES. Goldreich, Goldwasser, and
Micali [GGM86] show how to simulate a random ora-
cle from
a-bit strings to
b-bit strings by means of a con-
struction using a seed, that is, a secret and short random
string. They show that, if pseudorandom generators exist
[BM84, Yao82], then there exists a polynomial-time algo-
rithm
F
 
 
 
 
  such that, letting
s denote the seed, the func-
tion
f
s
def
 
F
 
s
 
 
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
 
f
 
 
 
g
b passes all efﬁ-
cient statistical tests for oracles. That is, to an observer
withsufﬁcientlylimited computationalresources,accessing
a random oracle from
f
 
 
 
g
a to
f
 
 
 
g
b is provably indis-
tinguishable from accessing (as an oracle)
f
s, even if al-
gorithm
F is publicly known (provided that
s is still kept
secret).
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTING VERIFIABLE PSEUDO-
RANDOM FUNCTIONS. By its very deﬁnition, a pseudoran-
dom oracle ` a la [GGM86] is not veriﬁable: without knowl-
edge of the seed (or any other additional information),upon
receiving the value
z of a pseudorandom oracle
f
s at point
x, one cannot distinguish it from an independently selected
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random string of the proper length. The possibility thus ex-
ists that, if it so suits him, the party knowing the seed
s may
declare that the value of his pseudorandom oracle at some
point
x is other than
f
s
 
x
  without fear of being detected. It
is for this reason that we refer to these objects as “pseudo-
random oracles” rather than using the standard terminology
“pseudorandom functions” — the values
f
s
 
x
  come “out
of the blue,” as if from an oracle, and the receiver must sim-
ply trust that they are computed correctly from the seed
s.
Therefore, though quite large, the applicability of pseu-
dorandom oracles is limited: for instance, to settings in
which (1) the “seed owner”, and thus the one evaluating
the pseudorandom oracle, is totally trusted; or (2) it is to
the seed-owner’s advantage to evaluate his pseudorandom
oracle correctly; or (3) there is absolutely nothing for the
seed-owner to gain from being dishonest.
One efﬁcientway of enablinganyoneto verifythat
f
s
 
x
 
really is the value of pseudorandom oracle
f
s at point
x
clearly consists of publicizing the seed
s. However, this
will also destroy the unpredictability of
f
s: anyone could
easily compute the value of
f
s at any point.
We instead wish to provide a new type of pseudoran-
dom oracle. Informally, we want one in which the owner
of the seed
s can, as usual, evaluate
f
s at any point, but
also prove (with an
N
P proof
1) that the so obtained values
are indeed correct without compromisingthe unpredictabil-
ity of the value of
f
s at any point
x for which no proof
of correctness for
f
s
 
x
  is given. That is, given an input
x, the seed-owner should be able to produce in polynomial
time the value
v
 
f
s
 
x
  together with a string
p
r
o
o
f
x ef-
ﬁciently proving that
v is correct. The scheme should have
the property that a unique value
v is provable as the value
of
f
s
 
x
 . We call such a mathematical object a veriﬁable
(pseudo-)randomfunction, VRF for brevity.
A WEAKER SOLUTION: PSEUDORANDOM ORACLES +
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS. If interaction were allowed,
VRFs could be constructed from GGM pseudorandom or-
acles via zero-knowledge proofs [GMR89] and a commit-
ment scheme. Indeed, as suggested in a signature scheme
of Bellare and Goldwasser [BG89], the owner of the seed
1Strictly speaking, we actually allow “
M
A proofs”, since their veriﬁ-
cation may be probabilistic.s to a pseudorandom oracle
f
s can publish a commitment
c
to
s. Whenever he wishes to prove that
v is the value of his
oracle at a point
x to a veriﬁer
V , he proves in zero knowl-
edge to
V that
v
 
f
s
 
x
  and that
c is a commitment to
s.
Such a statement is provable in zero knowledge because all
NP statements are provable in zero knowledge [GMW91].
The trouble with such an approach is that it requires inter-
action. A very efﬁcient incarnation of this idea is given by
Naor and Reingold [NR97], but it still suffers from the need
for interaction.
Such interaction could be removed by using noninter-
active zero-knowledgeproofs (NIZK) [BFM88, BDMP91],
as done by Bellare and Goldwasser [BG89]. This ap-
proachhoweversuffersfromanotherdrawback: noninterac-
tive zero-knowledge proofs presuppose that the prover and
veriﬁer share a bit-string that is guaranteed to be random.
So the question is who is to select this shared random string
R. Each of the possibilities has a deﬁciency that we wish to
avoid in deﬁning VRFs:
1. Theseed ownerselects
R: If the seedownerselects the
shared random string improperly, the soundness of the
NIZK proof system is no longer guaranteed, so there
may be many values
v that are “provable” as
f
s
 
x
 .
2. The veriﬁer selects
R: If the veriﬁer selects the shared
random string improperly, the zero-knowledge prop-
ertyof the NIZK proofsystem is no longerguaranteed.
Thus, by proving
f
s
 
x
 
 
v with respect to such an
improperly chosen
R, the prover may leak knowledge
about the seed
s and
f
s will “lose” its pseudorandom-
ness.
3. Theseedownerandveriﬁerjointlyselect
R bya “coin-
ﬂipping” protocol.: This requires interaction, which
we wish to avoid.
4. A trusted third party selects
R: We do not want to as-
sume the existence of such a trusted third party.
OUR SOLUTION. We propose a notion of VRF’s which
needs neither interaction nor sharing a guaranteed ran-
dom string. Rather, we only require that the owner of the
function
f publish a public key
P
K, which can be viewed
as a commitment to the function
f. (Indeed, something
must bind the owner to the function in order for “proving
the statement
f
 
x
 
 
v” to make sense.) The crucial way
in which our notion differs from what the NIZK-based ap-
proach discussed above achieves is:
For any public key
P
K, even an improperly chosen one, a
unique value
v is provable as the value of
f
 
x
 .
Thus, we may safely have the owner of the function unilat-
erally select and publish the public key. The most obvious
scenario in which this applies is when the public key can be
published once and for all, in a location where it cannot be
changed. But VRFs may also be useful in settings where
the public key is provided “on the ﬂy” to prove that vari-
ous function values (given previously or at the same time)
are indeed consistent with one single VRF. In case the VRF
outputs strings longer than the public key, it may even be
useful to provide the public key on the ﬂy to prove that
a single value is consistent with some VRF, as this would
limit the owner to relatively few choices.
In addition to introducing this notion, we provide an ex-
plicit VRF construction, based on a variant of the RSA as-
sumption. Informally stated, we prove:
Main Theorem: Assume that the RSA function with
large prime exponents cannot be inverted in polyno-
mial time. Then, there exists a VRF from
f
 
 
 
g
  into
f
 
 
 
g.
OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTRUCTION. We motivate our
construction by ﬁrst discussing the relationship between
VRFs and secure signature schemes. In a signature scheme
that is existentially unforgeable against a chosen message
attack [GMR88], the signature of a message
x, denoted
S
I
G
 
x
 , is a value that is unpredictable (even given sig-
natures of chosen other messages), but veriﬁable (given the
proper public key). However, such schemes do not directly
give rise to VRFs by setting
f
 
x
  to be
S
I
G
 
x
 , for two
reasons:
1. There may be many valid signatures for a given string
x (violating the unique provability requirement).
2.
S
I
G
 
x
  is only unpredictable, not necessarily pseudo-
random.
We begin by discussing the ﬁrst deﬁciency, as it is the
more seriousone. Eventhoughthe deﬁnitiondoes not guar-
antee the uniqueness of signatures, one might hope that ex-
istingsignatureschemeshappentohavethisproperty. How-
ever, most known secure signature schemes are either prob-
abilistic or history dependent. Either property violates the
the unique provability requirement: if we deﬁne
f
 
x
  to be
S
I
G
 
x
 , there may be a multiplicity of signatures of
x and
thus a multiplicity of
f
 
x
  values, all duly provable. One
can transform a probabilistic signature scheme, such as the
scheme in [GMR88], into a deterministic one if the signer
uses a GGM pseudorandom oracle to replace the random-
ness used. Even so, this does not yield a VRF because one
cannot be certain that the signer used the proper GGM ora-
cle when producing
S
I
G
 
x
 , and hence unique provability
is NOT guaranteed.
Moregenerally,itisnotenoughthatthespeciﬁedsigning
algorithm produces a unique signature for every message.
Rather, it should be the case that the veriﬁcation algorithm
accepts a unique (or at most one) signature for every mes-
sage (given any ﬁxed, but even improperly chosen, publickey). A signature scheme that satisﬁes this latter property
canbethoughtofas averiﬁableunpredictablefunction; that
is, averiﬁableunpredictablefunctionisdeﬁnedanalogously
to a veriﬁable pseudorandom function except the pseudo-
randomness requirement is replaced with unpredictability.
So the two questionsthat remain are (1) do veriﬁable un-
predictable functions imply veriﬁable pseudorandom func-
tions?, and (2) can we construct veriﬁable unpredictable
functions? Thenaturalapproachtoansweringtheﬁrst ques-
tion is to use the hardcore bit construction of Goldreich and
Levin [GL89], which is a general tool for converting un-
predictability to pseudorandomness. That is, we replace
the veriﬁable unpredictable function
f
 
x
  with
f
 
 
x
 
 
h
f
 
x
 
 
r
i, where
r is a randomlychosen binary string of the
same length as
f
 
x
  and
h
 
 
 
i denotes mod-2 inner product.
Note that for this construction to preserve veriﬁability,
r
should be placed in the public key (the proof that
f
 
 
x
 
 
b
is a string
v such that
h
r
 
v
i
 
b together with a proof that
f
 
x
 
 
v). Unfortunately, it has been shown by Naor and
Reingold [NR98] that using a public Goldreich–Levin vec-
tor
r does not work in general for converting unpredictable
functions into pseudorandom functions.
2 The way we get
around this obstacle is by noting that, a public
r can be
used if we restrict to functions whose input length is log-
arithmically related to the security. Then, we remove this
restriction on the input length via a tree-based construction
which converts any VRF with a ﬁxed input length into one
whose domain is
f
 
 
 
g
 .
Thus, we are left with the task of ﬁnding a veri-
ﬁable unpredictable function. Our construction builds
upon an RSA-based unpredictable number generator of
Shamir [Sha83], adapted to secure signature schemes by
[GMY83,DN94,CD96,GHR99,CS99]. Shamirshowsthat
seeing
r
1
 
e
i
m
o
d
m for different exponents
e
i
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
i
k
does does not help one predict
r
1
 
e
i
k
+
1
m
o
d
m as long as
all of these
k
 
  exponents are relatively prime to each
other and to
 
 
m
 . This suggests constructing a veriﬁable
unpredictablefunctionbyplacing
m and
r inthe publickey,
and deﬁning
f
 
i
  to be
v
 
r
1
 
e
i
m
o
d
m. This can be ver-
iﬁed simply by checking that
v
e
i
 
r
m
o
d
m; the solution
v
 
Z
 
m to this equation will be unique as long as
e
i is
guaranteed to be relatively prime to
 
 
m
 . Thus, we obtain
all the desired properties as long as we can efﬁciently index
into a set of such
e
i’s which are guaranteed to be all rela-
tively prime to each other and to
 
 
m
 . We accomplish this
by restricting to exponents which are distinct primes larger
than
m, and we index into such a set by using the prime se-
quence generator of Cachin, Micali, and Stadler [CMS99].
This turns out to yield a veriﬁable unpredictable function
whose input length is logarithmically related to the secu-
2Interestingly, they show that using a private
r does in fact work. This
is the only known application of the Goldreich–Levin hardcore bit where
keeping the vector private is necessary.
rity. This restriction on input length is of no concern, be-
cause we increase the input length after converting it into a
VRF using the tree-based construction mentioned above.
2 Preliminaries
 
If
A
 
 
  is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input
x, the notation “
A
 
x
 ” refers to the probability space that
assigns to the string
  the probability that
A, on input
x,
outputs
 . If
S is a probability space, then “
x
R
 
S” de-
notesthe algorithmwhichassignsto
x anelementrandomly
selected according to
S, and “
x
1
 
 
 
 
 
x
n
R
 
S” denotes
the algorithmthat respectivelyassignsto,
x
1
 
 
 
 
 
x
n,
n ele-
mentsrandomlyand independentlyselected accordingto
S.
If
F is a ﬁnite set, then the notation “
x
R
 
F” denotes the
algorithm that chooses
x uniformly from
F. If
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is a predicate, the notation
P
R
O
B
 
x
R
 
S
 
y
1
 
 
 
 
 
y
n
R
 
A
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
p
 
x
 
y
1
 
 
 
 
 
y
n
 
 
 
 
 
  denotes the probability
that
p
 
x
 
y
1
 
 
 
 
 
y
n
 
 
 
 
  will be true after the ordered ex-
ecution of the algorithms
x
R
 
S
 
y
1
 
 
 
 
 
y
n
R
 
A
 
x
 
 
 
 
 .
3 The Notion of a VRF
3.1 An Informal Exposition
VRF GENERATION. To be a VRF, a function
f must pos-
sess both
1. a compact, implicit representation, which does not en-
able one to evaluate
f efﬁciently, and
2. a compact, explicit representation, which enables any-
one to evaluate
f efﬁciently.
The ﬁrst representation can be viewed as
f’s public key,
P
K
f, and the second as its correspondingsecret key,
S
K
f.
Of course,
S
K
f will be hard to compute from
P
K
f. Ac-
cordingly,to formalize our notion of a VRF we make use of
a probabilistic generating algorithm
G outputting a public
key with its matching secret key from a sequence of coin
tosses.
VRF COMPUTATION AND VERIFICATION. Knowledge of
S
K
f enables one both to evaluate
f and to prove the cor-
rectnessofsuchevaluations. We actuallyenvisagethat
f
 
x
 
is always computed together with,
p
r
o
o
f
x, a string “prov-
ing its correctness”, by running an efﬁcient algorithm
F on
inputs
x and
S
K
f. The function
f proper is thus evalu-
ated by running
F, so as to obtain a function value and its
proof,andthen“strippingout”theproof. Thecorrectnessof
p
r
o
o
f
x is instead veriﬁed by running an efﬁcient algorithm
V on inputs
P
K
f,
x,
f
 
x
 , and
p
r
o
o
f
x. For convenience,
3Verbatim from [BDMP91] and [GMR88].we denote the two components of
F
 
S
K
 
x
  by
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
 
and
F
2
 
S
K
 
x
  (corresponding to the
f
 
x
  and
p
r
o
o
f
x, re-
spectively).
Because a proof of correctness for
f
 
x
  is only checked
against
f’spublickey,werequirethatitisimpossibletoﬁnd
a publickey(evena “fake”one)ofa VRF forwhichonecan
“prove”thecorrectnessoftwodifferentVRF outputsforthe
same VRF input.
VRF PSEUDORANDOMNESS. Our VRFs are unpredictable
in a very strong sense, that suitably generalizes to our con-
texttheoriginalnotionof[GGM86]. Informally,VRFspass
all efﬁcient statistical tests for functions at those values for
which no proof of correctness was provided. In essence,
an efﬁcient statistical test for veriﬁable functions is an ef-
ﬁcient algorithm
T that is given the public key of one of
our functions
f, and then “experiments with
f” by asking
and receiving both the function value and its corresponding
proof of correctness at any input of its choice. After this
experimentation phase,
T outputs a string
x in the domain
of
f, the exam, which is supposed to be different from any
input on which it has already queried the function. At this
point,
T is provided with a value
v that, with equal proba-
bility, consists of either (a)
f evaluated at the exam or (b)
a random value in
f’s range. Then
T enters a “judgement
phase,”inwhichit attemptstoguesswhether(a)or(b)isthe
case (after obtaining additional function values and proofs
at points of its choice other than
x). We say that our VRFs
pass statistical test
T if the probability of
T guessing cor-
rectly is not substantially better than
 
 
 .
We ﬁnd it convenient to think of
T as comprising two
components:
T
E and
T
J.
T
E is the experimental compo-
nent that queries
f and computes the exam, while
T
J the
judging component that, given the exam and
v, tries to dis-
tinguishes whether
v is the value of
f at the exam or a ran-
dom value. To enable coordination between
T
E and
T
J, we
let
T
E pass on to
T
J not only the exam, but also any piece
of “state” information that it may deem useful.
3.2 A Formal Deﬁnition
Deﬁnition (VRFs): Let
G,
F, and
V be polynomial-time
algorithms, where
 
G (the function generator) is probabilistic; receives as
input a unary string (the security parameter
k); and
outputs two binary strings (the public key
P
K and se-
cret key
S
K) ;
 
F
 
 
F
1
 
F
2
  (the function evaluator) is determinis-
tic; receives as input two binary strings (
S
K and an
input
x to the VRF); and outputs two binary strings
(the value
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
  of the VRF on
x and the corre-
sponding
p
r
o
o
f
 
F
2
 
S
K
 
x
 ); and
 
V (the function veriﬁer) is probabilistic; receives as
input four binary strings (
P
K,
x,
v, and
p
r
o
o
f ); and
outputs either
Y
E
S or
N
O.
Let
a
 
N
 
N
 
f
 
g and
b
 
s
 
N
 
N be any three func-
tions such that
a
 
k
 
 
b
 
k
 
 
s
 
k
  are all computable in time
poly
 
k
  and
a
 
k
  and
b
 
k
  are both bounded by a polyno-
mial in
k (except when
a takes on the value
 ). We say that
 
G
 
F
 
V
  isa veriﬁablepseudorandomfunction(VRF)with
input length
a
 
k
 ,
4 output length
b
 
k
 , and security
s
 
k
  if
the following properties hold:
1. The following conditions hold with probability
 
 
 
 
￿
(
k
) over
 
P
K
 
S
K
 
R
 
G
 
 
k
 :
(a) (Domain-Range Correctness):
for all
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
),
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
 
 
f
 
 
 
g
b
(
k
).
(b) (Complete Provability): for all
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
), if
 
v
 
p
r
o
o
f
 
 
F
 
S
K
 
x
 ,
P
R
O
B
 
 
V
 
P
K
 
x
 
v
 
p
r
o
o
f
 
 
Y
E
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
k
)
(this probability is over the coin tosses of
V ).
2. (UniqueProvability): For every
P
K,
x,
v
1,
v
2,
p
r
o
o
f
1,
and
p
r
o
o
f
2 such that
v
1
 
 
v
2, the following holds for
either
i
 
  or
i
 
 :
P
R
O
B
 
V
 
P
K
 
x
 
v
i
 
p
r
o
o
f
i
 
 
Y
E
S
 
 
 
 
 
(
k
)
(this probability over the coin tosses of
V ).
3. (Residual Pseudorandomness): Let
T
 
 
T
E
 
T
J
  be
any pair of algorithms such that
T
E
 
 
 
 
  and
T
J
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
run for a total of at most
s
 
k
  steps when their ﬁrst
input is
 
k. Then the probabilitythat
T succeedsin the
following experiment is at most
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
 
k
 :
(a) Run
G
 
 
k
  to obtain
 
P
K
 
S
K
 .
(b) Run
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
E
 
 
k
 
P
K
  to obtain
 
x
 
s
t
a
t
e
 .
(c) Choose
r
R
 
f
 
 
 
g.
i. if
r
 
 , let
v
 
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
 .
ii. if
r
 
 , choose
v
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
b
(
k
).
(d) Run
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
J
 
 
k
 
v
 
s
t
a
t
e
  to obtain
g
u
e
s
s.
(e)
T
 
 
T
E
 
T
J
  succeeds if
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
),
g
u
e
s
s
 
r, and
x was not asked as a query to
F
 
S
K
 
 
  by either
T
E or
T
J.
If
 
P
K
 
S
K
 
R
 
G
 
 
k
 , we shall refer to
f
 
 
 
 
F
1
 
S
K
 
 
  as an individual VRF. If
a
 
k
 
 
  for all
k, we
say that the VRF has unrestricted input length.
4When
a
 
k
  takes the value
 , it means that the VRF is deﬁned for
inputs of all lengths. Speciﬁcally, if
a
 
k
 
 
 , then
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
) is to be
interpreted as the set of all binary strings, as usual.Remarks.
1. Note the adversary
T
 
 
T
E
 
T
J
  is given
F
 
S
K
 
 
  as
an oracle, and thus gets answers that include function
values and proofs of their correctness.
2. A VRF with input length
a
 
k
  and output length
b
 
k
 
can and security
s
 
k
  can be converted into one with
input length
a
 
 
k
 
 
a
 
k
 
 
d
l
o
g
2
 
 
k
 
e, output length
b
 
 
k
 
 
b
 
k
 
 
 
 
k
 , and security
s
 
 
k
 
 
s
 
k
 
 
 
 
k
 .
Simply deﬁne
f
 
 
x
 
 
f
 
x
 
u
1
 
 
f
 
x
 
u
2
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
x
 
u
 
(
k
)
 , where
u
1
 
 
 
 
 
u
 
(
k
) are the ﬁrst
 
 
k
  strings of
length
d
l
o
g
2
 
 
k
 
e. (A factor of
  is lost in the secu-
rity because it takes
  queries to
f to simulate a single
query to
f
 , and because a factor of
  is lost in the ad-
versary’s success probability in the “hybrid argument”
based security reduction.)
Hence, to construct a VRF it is sufﬁcient to ﬁx
b
 
 
(i.e., to construct a “veriﬁable pseudorandom predi-
cate”), and vice versa. In this case, residual unpre-
dictability can be so simpliﬁed:
3
 . (Residual Pseudorandomness for Predicates): Let
T
 
 
 
 
  be any algorithm that runs in time
s
 
k
 
when its ﬁrst input is
 
k. Then the probability
that
T succeeds in the following experiment is at
most
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
 
k
 :
(a) Run
G
 
 
k
  to obtain
 
P
K
 
S
K
 .
(b) Run
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
 
 
k
 
P
K
  to obtain
 
x
 
g
u
e
s
s
 .
(c)
T succeeds if
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
),
g
u
e
s
s
 
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
 , and
x was not asked as a query
to
F
 
S
K
 
 
  by
T.
The reasons the “judgement” component
T
J can
be eliminated for predicates are: (a) there are
only two possible values for
v, so all the oracle
queries that
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
J
 
 
k
 
v
 
s
t
a
t
e
  would make
in case
v
 
  or
v
 
  can be asked before
actually receiving
v. (b) distinguishing a pred-
icate
f
 
x
  from a random bit with probability
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
 
k
 is equivalent to guessing
f
 
x
  with
the same probability (cf., [Yao82]).
In order to construct a VRF, we will ﬁrst construct a ver-
iﬁable unpredictable function, which can also be thought of
as a signature scheme in which a unique (or at most one)
signature is accepted by the veriﬁcation algorithm for every
message and public key.
Deﬁnition (VUFs): A veriﬁable unpredictable function
(VUF) (or unique signature scheme
5)
 
G
 
F
 
V
  with input
length
a
 
k
 , outputlength
b
 
k
 , and security
s
 
k
  is deﬁned
in the same way as a VRF, except that the Residual Pseudo-
randomness requirement is replaced with the following:
5The terminology “unique signature scheme” was suggested to us by
Moni Naor and Omer Reingold.
3. (Residual Unpredictability) Let
T
 
 
 
 
  be any algorithm
that runs in time
s
 
k
  when its ﬁrst input is
 
k. Then
the probability that
T succeeds in the following exper-
iment is at most
 
 
s
 
k
 :
1. Run
G
 
 
k
  to obtain
 
P
K
 
S
K
 .
2. Run
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
 
 
k
 
P
K
  to obtain
 
x
 
g
u
e
s
s
 .
3.
T succeeds if
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
(
k
),
g
u
e
s
s
 
F
1
 
S
K
 
x
 , and
x was not asked as a query to
F
 
S
K
 
 
  by
T.
4 Formal statement of results
First, we exhibit generaltechniquesfor convertingVUFs
to VRFs and increasing the input length for VRFs.
Proposition 1 (from VUF to VRF) If there is a VUF with
input length
a
 
k
 , output length
b
 
k
 , and security
s
 
k
 ,
then, for any
a
 
 
k
 
 
a
 
k
 , there is a VRF with input
length
a
 
 
k
 , output length
b
 
k
 
 
 , and security
s
 
 
k
 
 
s
 
k
 
1
 
3
 
 poly
 
k
 
 
 
a
0
(
k
)
 .
Proposition 2 (increasing the input length) If there is a
VRF with input length
a
 
k
 , output length 1, and se-
curity
s
 
k
 , then there is a VRF with unrestricted input
length, output length
b
 
k
 
 
 , and security at least
m
i
n
f
s
 
k
 
1
 
5
 
 
a
(
k
)
 
5
g
 poly
 
k
 .
These two propositionsreduce the problem of construct-
ing VRFs to constructing VUFs. We do the latter based on
a variant of the RSA assumption. We denote by
P
R
I
M
E
S
k
the set of the
k-bit primes, and by
R
S
A
k the set of com-
posite integers that are the product of two primes of length
b
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
c. (For
k large,
R
S
A
k contains the hardest
k-
bit inputs to any known factoring algorithm.) We make the
following assumption on the hardness of RSA, where the
exponents are primes (1-bit) bigger than the modulus. For
any function
s
 
k
  computable in time poly
 
k
 :
The
R
S
A
 
s
 
k
 -Hardness Assumption: Let
A be any
probabilistic algorithm which runs in time
s
 
k
  when its
ﬁrst input is
 
k. Then the probability that
A succeeds in the
following experiment is at most
 
 
s
 
k
 :
1. Select
m
R
 
R
S
A
k
 
x
R
 
Z
 
m
 
p
R
 
P
R
I
M
E
S
k
+
1
 
2. Let
y
R
 
A
 
 
k
 
m
 
x
 
p
 .
3.
A succeeds if
y
p
 
x
 
m
o
d
m
 .
Given the state-of-the-art in computational number theory,
it seems reasonable to take
s
 
k
 
 
 
k
 
for a small constant
 
 
 , though we will be able to construct VRFs as long as
s
 
k
 
 
k
 
(
1
).Proposition 3 (RSA-based VUFs) Let
a
 
k
 
  poly
 
k
 
and
s
 
k
  be any functions (both computable in time
poly
 
k
 ). Under the
R
S
A
 
s
 
k
 -Hardness Assumption,
there is a VUF with input length
a
 
k
 , output length
b
 
k
 
 
 , and security
s
 
 
k
 
 
s
 
k
 
 
 
 
a
(
k
)
  poly
 
k
 
 
.
Putting all the above together, we conclude:
Theorem 4 Under the
R
S
A
 
s
 
k
 -Hardness Assumption,
there is a VRF with unrestricted input length, output length
b
 
k
 
 
 , and security
s
 
k
 
1
 
3
5
 poly
 
k
 . In particular, if
s
 
k
 
 
k
 
(
1
) (i.e.,
R
S
A
  cannot be inverted in polynomial
time), then the VRF also has security
k
 
(
1
).
To deduce Theorem 4 we apply the above Propositions
with
a
 
k
 
 
a
 
 
k
 
 
 
l
o
g
s
 
k
 
 
 
 . Note that this requires
knowing an a priori lower bound
s
 
k
  on the security of
R
S
A
 . However,thisdrawbackcan beremoved. That is, we
can build VRFs whose construction is independent of the
hardness of
R
S
A
 , while the security remains polynomially
related to that of
R
S
A
 . This can be done using a standard
trick, which we describe in the full version of the paper.
5 From Unpredictability to Pseudorandom-
ness
In this section, we sketch how to prove Proposition 1,
using the Goldreich–Levin [GL89] hardcore bit to convert
veriﬁable unpredictable functions to veriﬁable pseudoran-
dom function. The construction and proof will be given in
more detail in the full version of the paper. Given a VUF
f
 
 
 , the VRF
f
 
 
 
  is deﬁned by
f
 
 
x
 
 
h
f
 
x
 
 
r
i, where
r is a binary vectorchosen uniformlyand placed in the pub-
lic key and
h
 
 
 
i denotes inner product mod 2. The proof
that
f
 
 
x
 
 
  consists of a value
v such that
h
v
 
r
i
 
 
and a proof that
f
 
x
 
 
v. The Domain-Range Correct-
ness, Complete Provability, and Unique Provability of
f
 
all follow immediately from the same properties of
f.
We now outline the steps in the proof of the residual
unpredictability of
f
 . Suppose, for sake of contradiction
that there is an adversary
T
  running in time
s
  that predicts
f
 
 
x
 
 
h
f
 
x
 
 
r
i at an unseen value with probability at
least
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
 . Then,
1.
T
  can actually be used to guess
h
f
 
x
 
 
r
i for a ran-
dom, prespeciﬁed
x rather than one that
T
  chooses
its own. This can be done at the price of reducing
T
 ’s
success probabilityto
 
 
 
 
 
  for
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
0
 
s
 
 , be-
cause a random
x will equal the exam
T
  chooses with
probability
 
 
 
a
0
. (Recall that
a
  is the inputlength for
f
 .)
2. By a Markov argument, at least an
 
 
 
  fraction of the
x’s,
6 the marginalprobabilitythat
T
  correctlyguesses
6Actually, the choice of
f and the coin tosses of
T should also be in-
cluded and ﬁxed with
x in this
 
 
 
  probability.
a’ y=f’(0  )
f’(f’(y1)0) f’(f’(y1)1)
f’(z1) f’(z0) f’(y1) f’(y0)
0
a’−1
a’−1 z=f’(0    1)
Figure 1. The tree construction
h
f
 
x
 
 
r
i taken just over the choice of
r is at least
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
3. The Goldreich–Levin reconstruction algorithm then
implies that for the same
 
 
 
  fraction
x’s,
f
 
x
  itself
can be computedwith probability at least
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
  at a
cost of increasing the running time of
T by a factor of
poly
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
4. All together this gives an adversary
T running in time
s
 
  poly
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
s which guesses
f
 
x
  correctly
at an unseen point with probability at least
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
s, contradicting the fact that
f has se-
curity
s.
6 Increasing the input length
In this section, we sketch the proof of Proposition 2,
which takes a VRF with small (but super-logarithmic) in-
put length and converts it into a VRF with unrestricted in-
put length. The construction and its analysis will be given
in more detail in the full version of the paper. Let
f be
any VRF with input length
a, output length 1, and se-
curity
s. By Remark 2 after the deﬁnition of VRFs, we
can easily transform
f into a VRF
f
  with input length
a
 
 
a
 
O
 
l
o
g
a
 , output length
b
 
 
a
 
 
 , and secu-
rity
s
 
 
s
 
b
 
 
s
 poly
 
k
 .
From this VRF
f
  which shrinks an
a
 -bit input by one
bit, we will construct a VRF
f
 
  which can take inputs
x of
arbitrary lengths. We view
f
  as deﬁning an inﬁnite binary
tree whose nodes are labelled by strings of length
a
 
 
 .
The root of the tree is labelled
 
a
0
 
1, and the two children
of a node labelled
y are labelled
f
 
 
y
 
  and
f
 
 
y
 
  (see
Figure 1). Now, to evaluate
f
 
  on a string
x, we view the
bits of
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
t as deﬁning a path of length
t from the
root of the tree. We deﬁne
f
 
 
 
x
  to be the label of the node
at the last point on this path. Now, a proof for the value off
 
  can be obtained by giving the labels of all nodes on this
path together with
f
 -proofs for each label.
One small problem with the construction as described so
far is that the path corresponding to a string
x contains the
path corresponding to all preﬁces of
x, so having seen the
proof for
f
 
 
 
x
 , one knows the value of
f
 
  on all preﬁces
of
x. To avoid this problem, we work with a preﬁx-free
encodingof strings, which is a map
x
 
 
 
x
  from
f
 
 
 
g
  to
f
 
 
 
g
  such that there is no pair
x
 
 
y where
 
x
  is a preﬁx
of
 
y
  and furthermore,
j
 
x
 
j
 
O
 
j
x
j
  for all
x. (It is easy to
construct such a map which is efﬁciently computable, e.g.,
 
b
1
b
2
 
 
 
b
t
 
 
b
1
b
1
b
2
b
2
 
 
 
b
t
b
t
 
 .)
So, in the actual construction,
f
 
 
 
x
  is computed as
follows: Let
 
x
 
 
b
1
 
 
 
b
t and
y
0
 
 
a
0
 
1, and recur-
sively compute
y
i
 
f
 
 
y
i
 
1
b
i
 .
f
 
 
 
x
  is deﬁned to be
y
t. The proof that
f
 
 
 
x
 
 
y is a sequence
 
y
1
 
 
 
 
 
y
t
 
such that
y
t
 
y together with proofs that
y
i
 
f
 
 
y
i
 
1
b
i
 .
TheDomain–RangeCorrectness,CompleteProvability,and
UniqueProvabilityof
f
 
  followfromthesamepropertiesof
f
 . The proof of Residual Pseudorandomness proceeds as
follows:
1. As long as the subtree of labels seen by the adversary
does not contain a repetition (i.e. two different nodes
in the tree that have the same label), the value of
f
 
 
at a new point
x is equal to the value of
f
  at a new
point
y (namely
y
 
y
t
 
1
b
t, where
 
x
 
 
b
1
b
2
 
 
 
b
t).
Hence, it is not be distinguishable from random.
2. The subtree of labels seen by the adversary does not
contain a repetition: This follows from the residual
pseudorandomnessof
f
  and the fact that
f
  has a rea-
sonably large output length
b
 . Suppose an efﬁcient
adversary does ﬁnd a repetition with noticeable proba-
bility. Then, one can predict
f
  by randomly guessing
whichofthetwonodesinthesubtreeformtheﬁrst rep-
etition, and using the label of the ﬁrst node to predict
the label of the second node. Being able to predict the
value of
f
  at a new point with probability noticeably
more than
 
 
 
b
0
distinguishes it from a random value,
violating the residual pseudorandomnessof
f
 .
7 A Veriﬁable Unpredictable Function
In this section we construct a VUF based on the
R
S
A
 
hardness assumption, provingProposition 3. First we recall
some basic number theory.
NUMBER THEORY. We write
 
a
 
b
  denote the greatest
common divisor of positive integers
a and
b. For a positive
integer
m, Euler’s totient function,
 
 
m
 , is deﬁned as the
number of positive integers
 
m that are relatively prime
to
m. Under multiplication modulo
m, the set of all such
integers form a group, denoted by
Z
 
m. In our VRF con-
struction, we shall use the following two well-known facts
about
 
 
m
 :
Fact 1: If
m is the productof two distinct primes
q
1 and
q
2,
then
 
 
m
 
 
 
q
1
 
 
 
 
 
q
2
 
 
 .
Fact 2: If
 
e
 
 
 
m
 
 
 
 , thenthemap
x
 
 
x
e
 
m
o
d
m
 
is a permutation on
Z
 
m. In particular, for any inte-
ger
r, there is at most one
x
 
Z
 
m such that
x
e
 
r
 
m
o
d
m
  (there will be none if
 
r
 
m
 
 
 
 ). This
x
(if it exists) is denoted
r
1
 
e and one can compute it in
polynomial time given inputs
m,
e,
x, and
 
 
m
 .
As outlined in the introduction, our VUF construc-
tion is based on the unpredictable number generator of
Shamir [Sha83]. The value of
f
 
x
  will be deﬁned as
r
1
 
p
x
 
m
o
d
m
 , where
m and
r
 
Z
 
m are public and
p
x is a
prime 1-bit larger than
m. To deﬁne the indexing
x
 
 
p
x
into a “random” set of large primes, we use a prime se-
quence generator of Cachin et al. [CMS99], which we de-
scribe ﬁrst.
THE PRIME-SEQUENCE GENERATOR. Ideally, a prime-
sequence generator is a 1-1 mapping
x
 
 
p
x from
a-
bit strings to
 
k
 
 
 -bit primes. Based on currently
known results on the distribution of primes, such a map-
ping certainly exists, but might not be efﬁciently com-
putable,unlessoneusessomeunprovenassumption—such
asCramer’sconjecture. To avoidmakingsuchassumptions,
we use a a construction of [CMS99], which probabilisti-
cally constructs such a mapping as follows: First, a
 
k
2-
wise independent function
Q from
f
 
 
 
g
a
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
2
g
to the set of
 
k
 
 
 -bit integers is randomly selected and
ﬁxed. Then,
p
x is deﬁned to be the ﬁrst prime among
Q
 
x
 
 
 
 
Q
 
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q
 
x
 
 
k
2
 . Primes are sufﬁciently
dense so that this sequence of independent
 
k
 
 
 -bit num-
bers will contain a prime with high probability, and even
just the pairwise independence of
Q guarantees that all the
p
x’s will be distinct with high probability.
To implement this idea, we need a polynomial-time
primality tester
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t, e.g. one of the al-
gorithms given in [SS77, Rab80]. Such an algorithm
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t takes a a
 
k
 
 
 -bit integer
n and
 
 
 
 
k
 
  poly
 
k
  random bits and outputs 1 with high prob-
ability if
n is prime and outputs 0 with high probability if
n is composite. We assume that the error probability of this
algorithm is at most
 
 
2
k on
 
k
 
 
 -bit inputs. In order
for the ﬁnal mapping to be deterministic, the random coins
of
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
twill be externally chosen and ﬁxed and
givenas input to
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q. Anothertechnicality is that the
 
k
2-wise mapping
Q will be deﬁned by a polynomial over
GF
 
 
k
 , so a representation of this ﬁeld (i.e., an irreducible
polynomial of degree
k over GF
 
 
 ) must be included with
Q.Now we formallydescribe the prime-sequencegenerator
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q. The only modiﬁcation to the construction of
[CMS99] is that we force its outputs to be “truly
 
k
 
 
 -
bit” integers (i.e., without leading 0’s).
Description of
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: an
a-bit string
x, a polynomial
Q of degreeat most
 
k
2
 
  over GF
 
 
k
  (togetherwith a representationof
the ﬁeld GF
 
 
k
 ), and an
 -bit string
c
o
i
n
s.
Output: a
 
k
 
 
 -bit integer
p
x (a prime with overwhelm-
ing probability over the choice of
Q and
c
o
i
n
s).
Code for
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 :
1. For
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
2, let
y
j bethe
 
k
 
 
 -bitstring
 
 
Q
 
x
 
 
j
 , where
 
j denotes the
j’th string in
f
 
 
 
g
k
 
a under the lexicographic order and we
associate GF
 
 
 
 
k
  with
f
 
 
 
g
k.
2. Use
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t with random coins
c
o
i
n
s
to test each
y
j (viewed as a
 
k
 
 
 -bit integer)
for primality, and let
p
x be the ﬁrst (probable)
prime in the sequence
y
1
 
y
2
 
 
 
 
 
y
2
k
2. Output
p
x.
The main property of this generator that we will use is the
following.
Proposition 5 ([CMS99]) Let
a
 
k
 
 . Then, with prob-
ability at least
 
 
 
 
￿
(
k
) over
Q and
c
o
i
n
s selected uni-
formly,
f
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a
g is a set of
 
a distinct
 
k
 
 
 -bit primes.
THE VUF. We now decribe the VUF construction. Fix
a
 
k
 , the input length, and
s
 
k
 , the assumed hardness of
R
S
A
 ; we mayassumethat
s
 
k
 
 
 
p
k, asknownfactoring
algorithms (cf., [Pom90]) can be break
R
S
A
  in that much
time. For notational convenience, we will usually hide the
dependence of the parameters
k, writing, for example,
a or
s instead of
a
 
k
  or
s
 
k
 . The generation algorithm
G
 
 
 
chooses the RSA modulus
m, the public
r
 
Z
 
m whose
roots will be the values of the function, and the random-
ization needed to ﬁx the prime sequence (the polynomial
Q
and the coin tosses for
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t).
Description of
G
 
 
 
Inputs: a security parameter
 
k.
Outputs: a public key
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and a secret
key
S
K
 
 
P
K
 
 
 
m
 
 , where
m
 
R
S
A
k;
r
 
Z
 
m;
c
o
i
n
s
 
f
 
 
 
g
 ; and
Q is a polynomial of degree at
most
 
k
2
 
  over GF
 
 
k
  (together with a representa-
tion of GF
 
 
k
 ).
Code for
G
 
 
k
 :
1. Use
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t to compute (by trial and
error) two random primes
q
1 and
q
2 (of length
b
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
c). Compute
m
 
q
1
q
2
 
R
S
A
k, and
then compute
 
 
m
 
 
 
q
1
 
 
 
 
 
q
2
 
 
 .
2.
r
R
 
Z
 
m,
c
o
i
n
s
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
 .
3. Choose a representation for GF
 
 
 
 
k
  (by ran-
domly picking degree
k polynomials over
GF
 
 
 
 
  and testing for irreducibiility) and let
Q
be selected uniformly from the set of all polyno-
mials of degree at most
 
k
2
 
  over GF
 
 
k
 .
4. Output
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
 
 
m
 .
When given
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a, the evaluation algorithm
F
uses
x to index into the prime sequence, obtaining a prime
p
x, and outputs the
p
x’th root of
r
 
Z
 
m as the value of
the VUF at
x. This value is its own proof, so we do not
include a separate proof in the output. Strictly speaking,
the output should be a bit-string of a ﬁxed length
b
 
k
 , so
elements of
Z
 
m should be written with leading zeroes to
make them of length exactly
k
 
  as strings. (Recall that
m is the product of two primes of length
b
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
c, so
m
 
 
 
(
k
 
1
)
 
2
+
1
 
2
 
 
k
+
1.)
DESCRIPTION OF
F
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: A secret key
S
K
 
 
P
K
 
 
 
m
 
 , where
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
x
 
f
 
 
 
g
a.
Output: a value
v
 
Z
 
m (which is its own proof).
Code for
F
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
 
 
m
 
 
x
 :
1. Compute
p
x
 
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
  (We
expect
p
x to be a
 
k
 
 
 -bit prime.)
2. Compute and output
v
 
r
1
 
p
x
 
m
o
d
m
 .
(easily done due to knowledge of
 
 
m
 ).
To check that the value of the VUF at point
x is
v, the
main thing the veriﬁcation algorithm needs to do is make
sure that
v is a
p
x’th root of
r mod
m, i.e.,
v
p
x
 
r
 
m
o
d
m
 . However, to guarantee that this value is unique,
it also should check that
p
x is in fact a prime larger than
m
and that
v
 
Z
 
m.
Description of
V
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: A public key
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 , a point
x,
and a value
v.
Output:
Y
E
S or
N
O.
Code for
V
 
 
k
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
x
 
v
 :
1. Compute
p
x
 
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
2. Check that
p
x is greater than
m and is prime
(byrunning
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
tusingfreshrandom
coin tosses, not those from the public key).
3. Check that
v
 
Z
 
m and
v
p
x
 
r
 
m
o
d
m
 .
4. If all checks pass, output
Y
E
S. Otherwise, out-
put
N
O.7.1 Correctness of the VUF construction
In this section, we prove that
 
G
 
F
 
V
  described in the
previous section is in fact a VRF with security
s
 
 
k
 
 
s
 
k
 
1
 
7, establishing Proposition 3. The efﬁciency of the
algorithms
G,
F, and
V is apparent, so we proceed to the
other conditions.
DOMAIN–RANGE CORRECTNESS & COMPLETE PROV-
ABILITY. By Proposition 5, it is true that with probabil-
ity
 
 
 
 
￿
(
k
) over the generation of the keys
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
S
K
 
 
 
 
m
 
 , that all the values
p
x
 
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Y
 
y
 
z
  are primes of length
k
 
 .
Since
 
 
m
 
 
m
 
 
k
+
1, it follows that all of these
p
x’s
are relatively prime with
 
 
m
 , and hence
r has a
p
x’th
root modulo
 
 
m
 . Given that these roots exist, it is im-
mediate that
F will successfully compute them, establish-
ing Domain–Range Correctness. Complete Provability also
follows immediately; the only reason
V would reject a cor-
rect proof is a faulty execution of the primality testing al-
gorithm
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
t(which occurswith exponentially
small probability).
UNIQUE PROVABILITY. Assume that an adversary
chooses a (good-looking but illegitimate) public key
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and consider any input
x. If
p
x
def
 
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  is not prime or is not larger than
m, then the veriﬁcation algorithm will detect this and reject
with high probability. If
p
x is a prime larger than
m, then
p
x must be relativelyprimeto
 
 
m
 , so
r hasa unique
p
x’th
root mod
m, and this is the only value that the veriﬁcation
algorithm will accept.
RESIDUAL UNPREDICTABILITY. Suppose,forsake of con-
tradiction,
 
G
 
F
 
V
  is not an
s
 
 
k
 -secure VUF and let
T
betheadversaryrunningintime
s
 
 
k
  thatguessesthe value
of the function at an unseen point with probability at least
 
 
s
 
 
k
 .
We will use
T to construct an algorithm
A that con-
tradicts the
R
S
A
 
s
 
k
 -Hardness Assumption.
A will be
given a modulus
m, a prime
p, and
u
 
Z
 
m as input, from
which it will construct a public key
P
K which it will give
to
T. Thus, we ﬁrst concentrate on how the public key
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  will be constructed.
Q will be cho-
sen in such a way that
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
0
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
p for a
speciﬁed
x
0
 
f
 
 
 
g
a. This meansthat
 
 
Q
 
x
 
 
j
0
  should
equal
p for some
j
0
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
2
g, while
 
 
Q
 
x
 
 
j
 
should be composite for
j
 
j
0. We want the distribution
of
Q obtained in this way (when
p is a random
 
k
 
 
 -bit
prime) to be close to its distribution in the actual scheme,
which is uniform. This is done using the following proce-
dure:
Description of
C
h
o
o
s
e
P
o
l
y
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: a prime
p of length
k
 
 , and
x
0
 
f
 
 
 
g
a.
Output: a polynomial
Q of degree at most
 
k
2
 
 
over GF
 
 
k
  and a
 -bit string
c
o
i
n
s (such that
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
0
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
p)
Code for
C
h
o
o
s
e
P
o
l
y
 
p
 
x
0
 :
1.
w
1
 
 
 
 
 
w
2
k
2
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
k
2. Let
j
0 be the smallest
j such that
 
 
w
j is prime
(by running
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
ton each of them).
3. Choose and ﬁx a representation for GF
 
 
k
  (ex-
actly as done in the generation algorithm
G).
4. Let
Qbetheuniquepolynomialofdegreeatmost
 
k
2
 
  over GF
 
 
k
  subject to the conditions
Q
 
x
0
 
 
j
0
 
 
p and
Q
 
x
0
 
 
j
 
 
w
j for all
j
 
 
j
0
(where
 
j denotesthe
 
k
 
a
 -bit representationof
j, with possible leading zeroes). This step can be
implemented using standard polynomial interpo-
lation.
5.
c
o
i
n
s
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
 .
6. Output
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 .
Claim 6 For every
x
0
 
f
 
 
 
g
a, the distribution on
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  obtained by running
C
h
o
o
s
e
P
o
l
y
 
p
 
x
0
  for a
random prime
p of length
k
 
  has statistical difference
7
 
 
￿
(
k
) from the uniform distribution on
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 .
It is straightforward to verify this claim using Propo-
sition 5 and the fact that the error probability of
P
r
i
m
a
l
i
t
y
T
e
s
tis
 
 
2
k. Ofcourse,
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  is onlypart
of the public key. We now describe how the remainder of
the public key is generated. On input
 
m
 
p
 
u
 , the follow-
ing algorithm
G
  will “guess” which point
x
0 the adversary
T will choose as its exam; use
C
h
o
o
s
e
P
o
l
y to guarantee
that
p
x
0
 
p; and, following [Sha83], prepare
r
 
Z
 
m
so that the
p
x’th root of
r can be easily computed for all
x
 
 
x
0, while the
p
x
0’th root of
r can be used to compute
the
p’th root of
u. (This will all be proven in more detail
shortly.)
Description of
G
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: a modulus
m
 
R
S
A
k, a prime
p of length
k
 
 ,
and
u
 
Z
 
m.
Output:
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
x
0
 
f
 
 
 
g
a.
Code for
G
 
 
m
 
p
 
u
 :
1.
x
0
R
 
f
 
 
 
g
a.
2.
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
R
 
C
h
o
o
s
e
P
o
l
y
 
p
 
x
0
 .
7The statistical difference between two random variables
X and
Y is
deﬁned to be
m
a
x
S
j
P
R
O
B
 
X
 
S
 
 
P
R
O
B
 
Y
 
S
 
j.3. Set
e
 
Q
x
 
=
x
0
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
r
 
u
e
 
m
o
d
m
 .
4. Output
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
x
0.
Claim 7 The distribution on
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
x
0
  ob-
tained by running
G
  on
m
R
 
R
S
A
k,
p
R
 
P
R
I
M
E
S
k
+
1,
u
R
 
Z
 
m has statistical difference at most
 
 
￿
(
k
)
from the distribution obtained by running
G
 
 
k
  to select
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and independently selecting
x
0 uniformly
in
f
 
 
 
g
a.
Claim 7 is easily deduced from Claim 6 and the fact
that the map
u
 
 
u
e is a permutation on
Z
 
m as long as
 
e
 
 
 
m
 
 
 
  (which is the case, since
e is the product
of primes greater than
 
 
m
  with high probability). By
Claim 7, if
T is presented with a public key generated by
G
 , it’s success probability will be reduced to by only an
exponentially small amount to
 
 
s
 
 
k
 
 
 
 
￿
(
k
). In addi-
tion, since
x
0 is independent from the public key produced
by
G
  (up to statistical difference
 
 
￿
(
k
)), the event that
T
chooses
x
0 as its exam is also independent of
T’s success.
Hence, additionally requiring that
T’s success be at
x
0 only
decreases the success probability by a factor of
 
 
 
a. To
formalize this, we consider the following experiment.
Experiment A:
1.
m
R
 
R
S
A
k;
p
R
 
P
R
I
M
E
S
k
+
1;
u
R
 
Z
 
m
2.
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
x
0
 
R
 
G
 
 
m
 
p
 
u
 
3. Set
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 ,
S
K
 
 
P
K
 
 
 
m
 
 
4.
 
x
 
g
u
e
s
s
 
 
T
F
(
S
K
 
 
)
5.
T succeeds if
x
 
x
0,
g
u
e
s
s
 
F
 
S
K
 
x
  (i.e.,
g
u
e
s
s
p
 
r
 
m
o
d
m
 ), and
x was not asked to the
oracle
F
 
S
K
 
 
 .
By Claim 7 and the above discussion, it follows that the
probability that
T succeeds in Experiment A is at least
 
  def
 
 
 
 
 
a
 
s
 
 
k
 
 
 
 
 
￿
(
k
)
 
 
 
s.
Now we use the analysis of Shamir [Sha83], which
shows that since
r
 
u
e where
e
 
Q
x
0
 
=
x
0
p
x
0, it is easy
to answer all of
T’s queries for
F
 
S
K
 
x
 
  (for
x
 
 
 
x
0)
without using
 
 
m
 . In addition, from
F
 
S
K
 
x
0
 
 
r
1
 
p,
it is easy to compute
u
1
 
p. In more detail, we consider the
following algorithm
A.
Description of
A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: a
k-bit modulus
m, a prime
p of length
k
 
 , and
u
 
Z
 
m.
Output:
u
1
 
p (hopefully)
Code for
A
 
m
 
p
 
u
 :
1.
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 
 
x
0
 
R
 
G
 
 
m
 
p
 
u
 
2. Set
P
K
 
 
m
 
r
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
  and
e
 
Q
x
 
=
x
0
p
x,
where
p
x
def
 
P
r
i
m
e
S
e
q
 
x
 
Q
 
c
o
i
n
s
 .
3. Simulate
T
 
 
k
 
P
K
 . Respond to an oracle
query
y as follows:
(a) If
y
 
x
0, abort with output
F
A
I
L.
(b) If
y
 
 
x
0, respond with
r
1
 
p
y
 
u
e
y
 
m
o
d
m
 , where
e
y
 
e
 
p
y.
4. Obtain output
 
x
 
g
u
e
s
s
  from
T.
5. If
g
u
e
s
s
p
 
 
r
 
m
o
d
m
 , then output
F
A
I
L.
6. If
g
u
e
s
s
p
 
r, use the GCD algorithm to calcu-
late
 
 
 
 
Zsuch that
 
e
 
 
p
 
 , and output
g
u
e
s
s
 
u
 .
Claim 8
A
 
m
 
p
 
u
 
 
u
1
 
p
 
m
o
d
m
  with probability
at least
 
 
 
 
 
s (over the choice of
m
R
 
R
S
A
k,
p
R
 
P
R
I
M
E
S
k
+
1,
u
R
 
Z
 
m, and the coins of
A).
We now quickly justify this claim. A straightforward
calculation shows that the responses to
T’s oracle queries
are computed correctly (when
y
 
 
x
0). Thus, as long as
T
does not ask oracle query
x
0, everything proceeds exactly
as in Experiment A. Our analysis of Experiment A tells us
that with probability at least
 
 ,
T
  does not ask query
x
0
and
g
u
e
s
s
 
r
1
 
p
x
0
 
r
1
 
p. The GCD algorithm will
succeed as long as all the
p
x’s are distinct, and this is the
case with overwhelming probability by Proposition 5 and
Claim 6. Assuming
g
u
e
s
s
 
r
1
 
p and the GCD algorithm
succeeds, it follows that
g
u
e
s
s
 
u
 
 
r
 
 
p
u
 
 
 
u
e
 
 
 
p
u
 
 
u
(
 
e
+
 
p
)
 
p
 
u
1
 
p
 
m
o
d
m
 
 
We now just need to analyze the running time of
A.
A’s running time is dominated by simulating the oracle
queries of
T. For every oracle query of
T,
A must com-
pute
u
e
y
m
o
d
m, where
e
y is an integer of length
O
 
 
a
 
k
 
(since
e is the product of
 
a
 
  primes of length
k
 
 ).
This modularexponenationtakes time
O
 
 
a
 
k
 
 poly
 
k
 
 
 
a
 poly
 
k
 . Since there
T makes at most
s
  oracle queries,
the total running time is at most
s
 
 
 
a
  poly
 
k
 
 
s, vio-
lating the
R
S
A
 
s
 
k
 -Hardness Assumption.
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